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Abstract
Deep reinforcement learning (RL) policies are known to be vulnerable to ad-
versarial perturbations to their observations, similar to adversarial examples for
classifiers. However, an attacker is not usually able to directly modify another
agent’s observations. This might lead one to wonder: is it possible to attack
an RL agent simply by choosing an adversarial policy acting in a multi-agent
environment so as to create natural observations that are adversarial? We demon-
strate the existence of adversarial policies in zero-sum games between simulated
humanoid robots with proprioceptive observations, against state-of-the-art vic-
tims trained via self-play to be robust to opponents. The adversarial policies
reliably win against the victims but generate seemingly random and uncoordinated
behavior. We find that these policies are more successful in high-dimensional
environments, and induce substantially different activations in the victim policy net-
work than when the victim plays against a normal opponent. Videos are available
at https://adversarialpolicies.github.io/.
1 Introduction
The discovery of adversarial examples for image classifiers prompted a new field of research into
adversarial attacks and defenses (Szegedy et al., 2014). Recent work has shown that deep RL policies
are also vulnerable to adversarial perturbations of image observations (Huang et al., 2017; Kos and
Song, 2017). However, real-world RL agents inhabit natural environments populated by other agents,
including humans, who can only modify observations through their actions. We explore whether
it’s possible to attack a victim policy by building an adversarial policy that takes actions in a shared
environment, inducing natural observations which have adversarial effects on the victim.
RL has been applied in settings as varied as autonomous driving (Dosovitskiy et al., 2017), nego-
tiation (Lewis et al., 2017) and automated trading (Noonan, 2017). In domains such as these, an
attacker cannot usually directly modify the victim policy’s input. For example, in autonomous driving
pedestrians and other drivers can take actions in the world that affect the camera image, but only in a
physically realistic fashion. They cannot add noise to arbitrary pixels, or make a building disappear.
Similarly, in financial trading an attacker can send orders to an exchange which will appear in the
victim’s market data feed, but the attacker cannot modify observations of a third party’s orders.
As a proof of concept, we show the existence of adversarial policies in zero-sum simulated robotics
games with proprioceptive observations (Bansal et al., 2018a). The state-of-the-art victim policies
were trained via self-play to be robust to opponents. We train each adversarial policy using model-free
RL against a fixed black-box victim. We find the adversarial policies reliably beat their victim, despite
training for less than 3% of the time steps initially used to train the victim policies.
Critically, we find the adversaries win by creating natural observations that are adversarial, and not
by becoming generally strong opponents. Qualitatively, the adversaries fall to the ground in contorted
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Figure 1: Illustrative snapshots of a victim (in blue) against normal and adversarial opponents (in red).
The victim wins if it crosses the finish line; otherwise, the opponent wins. Despite never standing up,
the adversarial opponent wins 86% of episodes, far above the normal opponent’s 47% win rate.
positions, as illustrated in Figure 1, rather than learning to run, kick or block like normal opponents.
This strategy does not work when the victim is ‘masked’ and cannot see the adversary’s position,
suggesting that the adversary succeeds by manipulating a victim’s observations through its actions.
Having observed these results, we wanted to understand the sensitivity of the attack to the number of
dimensions of the victim’s observations the attacker can influence. We test this by varying the robotic
body (Humanoid, with 24 dimensions influenced by the attacker, and Ant, with 15 dimensions), while
keeping the high-level task the same. We find victim policies in the higher-dimensional Humanoid
environments are substantially more vulnerable to adversarial policies than in Ant.
To gain insight into why adversarial policies succeed, we analyze the activations of the victim’s policy
network using a Gaussian Mixture Model and t-SNE (Maaten and Hinton, 2008). We find adversarial
policies induce significantly different activations than normal opponents. Furthermore, the adversarial
activations are typically more widely dispersed across time steps than normal activations.
Our paper makes three contributions. First, we propose a novel, physically realistic threat model for
adversarial examples in RL. Second, we demonstrate the existence of adversarial policies in this threat
model, in several simulated robotics games. Our adversarial policies reliably beat the victim, despite
training with less than 3% as many timesteps and generating seemingly random behavior. Third,
we conduct a detailed analysis of why the adversarial policies work. We show they create natural
observations that are adversarial to the victim and push the activations of the victim’s policy network
off-distribution. Additionally, we find policies are easier to attack in high-dimensional environments.
As deep RL is increasingly deployed in environments with potential adversaries, we believe it is
important that practitioners are aware of this previously unrecognized threat model. Moreover, even in
benign settings, we believe adversarial policies can be a useful tool for uncovering unexpected policy
failure modes. Finally, we are excited by the potential of adversarial training using adversarial policies,
which could improve robustness relative to conventional self-play by training against adversaries that
exploit weaknesses undiscovered by the distribution of similar opponents present during self-play.
2 Related Work
Most study of adversarial examples has focused on small `p norm perturbations to images, which
Szegedy et al. (2014) discovered cause a variety of models to confidently mispredict the class, even
though the changes are visually imperceptible to a human. Gilmer et al. (2018a) argued that attackers
are not limited to small perturbations, and can instead construct new images or search for naturally
misclassified images. Similarly, Uesato et al. (2018) argue that the near-ubiquitous `p model is merely
a convenient local approximation for the true worst-case risk. We follow Goodfellow et al. (2017) in
viewing adversarial examples more broadly, as “inputs to machine learning models that an attacker
has intentionally designed to cause the model to make a mistake.”
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The little prior work studying adversarial examples in RL has assumed an `p-norm threat model.
Huang et al. (2017) and Kos and Song (2017) showed that deep RL policies are vulnerable to small
perturbations in image observations. Recent work by Lin et al. (2017) generates a sequence of
perturbations guiding the victim to a target state. Our work differs from these previous approaches by
using a physically realistic threat model that disallows direct modification of the victim’s observations.
Specifically, we model the adversary and victim as agents in a Markov game, drawing on a long tradi-
tion in multi-agent reinforcement learning (Littman, 1994). Competitive multi-agent environments
are useful as a source of concrete threat models (Lowe et al., 2017; Bansal et al., 2018a). However,
finding an adversarial policy is a single-agent RL problem since the victim policy is fixed.
Adversarial training is a common defense to adversarial examples, achieving state-of-the-art robust-
ness in image classification (Xie et al., 2019). Prior work has also applied adversarial training to
improve the robustness of deep RL policies, where the adversary exerts a force vector on the victim
or varies dynamics parameters such as friction (Pinto et al., 2017; Mandlekar et al., 2017; Pattanaik
et al., 2018). We hope to explore adversarial training with adversarial policies in future work. We
expect this to produce policies robust to opponents unlike those they were trained with, in contrast to
conventional self-play which only trains for robustness in a small region of policy space.
3 Framework
We model the victim as playing against an opponent in a two-player Markov game (Shapley, 1953).
Our threat model assumes the attacker can control the opponent, in which case we call the opponent
an adversary. We denote the adversary and victim by subscript α and ν respectively. The game
M = (S, (Aα, Aν), T, (Rα, Rν)) consists of state set S, action sets Aα and Aν , and a joint state
transition function T : S ×Aα ×Aν → ∆ (S) where ∆ (S) is a probability distribution on S. The
reward function Ri : S ×Aα×Aν ×S → R for player i ∈ {α, ν} depends on the current state, next
state and both player’s actions. Each player wishes to maximize their (discounted) sum of rewards.
The adversary is allowed unlimited black-box access to actions sampled from piv , but is not given any
white-box information such as weights or activations. We further assume the victim agent follows a
fixed stochastic policy piv , corresponding to the common case of a pre-trained model deployed with
static weights. Safety-critical systems are particularly likely to use a fixed or infrequently updated
model due to the considerable expense of real-world testing.
Since the victim policy piν is held fixed, the two-player Markov game M reduces to a single-player
MDPMα = (S,Aα, Tα, R′α) that the attacker must solve. The state and action space of the adversary
are the same as in M, while the transition and reward function have the victim policy piν embedded:
Tα (s, aα) = T (s, aα, aν) and R′α(s, aα) = Rα(s, aα, aν),
where the victim’s action is sampled from the stochastic policy aν ∼ piν(· | s). The goal of the
attacker is to find an adversarial policy piα maximizing the sum of discounted rewards:
∞∑
t=0
γtRα(s
(t), a(t)α , s
(t+1)), where s(t+1) ∼ Tα(s(t), a(t)α ) and aα ∼ piα(· | s(t)). (1)
Note the MDP’s dynamics Tα will be unknown even if the Markov game’s dynamics T are known
since the victim policy piν is a black-box. Consequently, the attacker must solve an RL problem.
4 Finding Adversarial Policies
We demonstrate the existence of adversarial policies in zero-sum simulated robotics games. First, we
describe how the victim policies were trained and the environments they operate in. Subsequently, we
provide details of our attack method in these environments, and describe several baselines. Finally,
we present a quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the adversarial policies and baseline opponents.
4.1 Environments and Victim Policies
We attack victim policies for the zero-sum simulated robotics games created by Bansal et al. (2018a),
illustrated in Figure 2. The victims were trained in pairs via self-play against random old versions of
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(a) Kick and Defend (b) You Shall Not Pass (c) Sumo Humans (d) Sumo Ants
Figure 2: Illustrations of the zero-sum simulated robotics games from Bansal et al. (2018a) we use
for evaluation. Environments are further described in Section 4.1.
their opponent, for between 680 and 1360 million time steps. We use the pre-trained policy weights
released in the “agent zoo” of Bansal et al. (2018b). In symmetric environments, the zoo agents are
labeled ZooN where N is a random seed. In asymmetric environments, they are labeled ZooVN and
ZooON representing the Victim and Opponent agents.
All environments are two-player games in the MuJoCo robotics simulator. Both agents observe the
position, velocity and contact forces of joints in their body, and the position of their opponent’s joints.
The episodes end when a win condition is triggered, or after a time limit, in which case the agents
draw. We evaluate in all environments from Bansal et al. (2018a) except for Run to Goal, which we
omit as the setup is identical to You Shall Not Pass except for the win condition. We describe the
environments below, and specify the number of zoo agents and their type (MLP or LSTM):
Kick and Defend (3, LSTM). A soccer penalty shootout between two Humanoid robots. The
positions of the kicker, goalie and ball are randomly initialized. The kicker wins if the ball goes
between the goalposts; otherwise, the goalie wins, provided it remains within 3 units of the goal.
You Shall Not Pass (1, MLP). Two Humanoid agents are initialized facing each other. The runner
wins if it reaches the finish line; the blocker wins if it does not.
Sumo Humans (3, LSTM). Two Humanoid agents compete on a round arena. The players’ positions
are randomly initialized. A player wins by remaining standing after their opponent has fallen.1
Sumo Ants (4, LSTM). The same task as Sumo Humans, but with ‘Ant’ quadrupedal robot bodies.
We use this task in Section 5.2 to investigate the importance of dimensionality to this attack method.
4.2 Methods Evaluated
Following the RL formulation in Section 3, we train an adversarial policy to maximize Equation 1
using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) (Schulman et al., 2017). We give a sparse reward at the
end of the episode, positive when the adversary wins the game and negative when it loses or ties.
Bansal et al. (2018a) trained the victim policies using a similar reward, with an additional dense
component at the start of training. We train for 20 million time steps using Stable Baselines’s PPO
implementation (Hill et al., 2019). The hyperparameters were selected through a combination of
manual tuning and a random search of 100 samples; see Section A in the supplementary material for
details. We compare our methods to three baselines: a policy Rand taking random actions; a lifeless
policy Zero that exerts zero control; and all pre-trained policies Zoo* from Bansal et al. (2018a).
4.3 Results
Quantitative Evaluation We find the adversarial policies reliably win against most victim policies,
and outperform the pre-trained Zoo baseline for a majority of environments and victims. We report
the win rate over time against the median victim in each environment in Figure 3, with full results in
Figure 6 in the supplementary material. Win rates against all victims are summarized in Figure 4.
Qualitative Evaluation The adversarial policies beat the victim not by performing the intended
task (e.g. blocking a goal), but rather by exploiting weaknesses in the victim’s policy. This effect is
best seen by watching the videos at https://adversarialpolicies.github.io/. In Kick and
1Bansal et al. (2018a) consider the episode to end in a tie if a player falls before it is touched by an opponent.
Our win condition allows for attacks that indirectly modify observations without physical contact.
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Figure 3: Win rates while training adversary Adv against the median victim in each environment
(based on the difference between the win rate for Adv and Zoo). The adversary outperforms
the baseline against the median victim in Kick and Defend and You Shall Not Pass, and is com-
petitive on Sumo Humans. For full results, see figure 4 below or figure 6 in the supplementary material.
Key: The solid line shows the median win rate for Adv across 5 random seeds, with the
shaded region representing the minimum and maximum. The win rate is smoothed with a rolling
average over 100, 000 timesteps. Baselines are shown as horizontal dashed lines. Agents Rand and
Zero take random and zero actions respectively. The Zoo baseline is whichever ZooM (Sumo) or
ZooOM (other environments) agent achieves the highest win rate. The victim is ZooN (Sumo) or
ZooVN (other environments), where N is given in the title above each figure.
Defend and You Shall Not Pass, the adversarial policy never stands up. The adversary instead wins by
taking actions that induce adversarial observations causing the victim’s policy to take poor actions. A
robust victim could easily win, a result we demonstrate in Section 5.1.
This flavor of attacks is impossible in Sumo Humans, since the adversarial policy immediately loses if
it falls over. Faced with this control constraint, the adversarial policy learns a more high-level strategy:
it kneels in the center in a stable position. Surprisingly, this is very effective against victim 1, which
in 88% of cases falls over attempting to tackle the adversary. However, it proves less effective against
victims 2 and 3, achieving only a 62% and 45% win rate, below Zoo baselines. We further explore
the importance of the number of dimensions the adversary can safely manipulate in Section 5.2.
Distribution Shift One might wonder if the adversarial policies are winning simply because they
are outside the training distribution of the victim. To test this, we evaluate victims against two simple
off-distribution baselines: a random policy Rand (green) and a lifeless policy Zero (red). These
baselines win as often as 30% to 50% in Kick and Defend, but less than 1% of the time in Sumo and
You Shall Not Pass. This is well below the performance of our adversarial policies. We conclude
that most victim policies are robust to typical off-distribution observations. Although our adversarial
policies do produce off-distribution observations, this is insufficient to explain their performance.
5 Understanding Adversarial Policies
In the previous section we demonstrated adversarial policies exist for victims in a range of competitive
simulated robotics environments. In this section, we focus on understanding why these policies exist.
In Section 5.1 we establish that adversarial policies rely on manipulating the victim through their
own body position. We show in Section 5.2 that victims are more vulnerable to adversarial policies in
high-dimensional environments. Finally, in Section 5.3 we analyze the activations of the victim’s
policy network, showing they differ substantially when playing an adversarial opponent.
5.1 Masked Policies
We have previously shown that adversarial policies are able to reliably win against victims. In
this section, we demonstrate that they win by taking actions to induce natural observations that are
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(b) You Shall Not Pass.
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Figure 4: Percentage of episodes won by opponent of victim (out of 1000). The maximal cell in
each row has a red border. The adversary outperforms the baselines in Kick and Defend and You
Shall Not Pass, is comparable in Sumo Humans, but performs poorly in Sumo Ants (see Section 5.2).
Importantly, ‘masking’ the victim so it cannot see the adversary improves the victim’s win rate (see
Section 5.1). Victim win rates and ties are reported in figure 7 in the supplementary material.
Key: Agents Zoo* are pre-trained policies by Bansal et al. (2018a). In Sumo, a symmetric
environment, they are labeled ZooN where N is a random seed. In the other (asymmetric)
environments, they are labeled ZooVN and ZooON for the Victim and Opponent agents. Victims with
observations masked are labeled ZooMVN or ZooMN. Opponents AdvN are the best adversarial policy
of 5 seeds trained against the corresponding ZooVN or ZooN. Agents Rand and Zero are baseline
agents taking random and zero actions respectively. dimO, dimA and dimP are the dimensions of
the Observations, Actions, and Position of the opponent (part of the victim’s observation O).
adversarial to the victim, and not by physically interfering with the victim. To test this, we introduce
a ‘masked‘ victim (labeled ZooMN or ZooMVN) that is the same as the normal victim ZooN or ZooVN,
except the observation of the adversary’s position is set to a static value corresponding to a typical
initial position. We use the same adversarial policy against the normal and masked victim.
One would expect it to be beneficial to be able to see your opponent. Indeed, the masked victims
do worse than a normal victim when playing normal opponents. For example, Figure 4b shows that
in You Shall Not Pass the normal opponent ZooO1 wins 78% of the time against the masked victim
ZooMV1 but only 47% of the time against the normal victim ZooV1. However, the relationship is
reversed when playing an adversary. The normal victim ZooV1 loses 86% of the time to adversary
Adv1 whereas the masked victim ZooMV1 wins 99% of the time. This pattern is particularly clear in
You Shall Not Pass, but the trend is similar in other environments, confirming that the adversary wins
by taking actions that indirectly cause natural observations that are adversarial for the victim.
This result is surprising as it implies highly non-transitive relationships may exist between policies
even in games that seem to be transitive. A game is said to be transitive if policies can be ranked such
that higher-ranked policies beat lower-ranked policies. Prima facie, the games in this paper seem
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(a) Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM): likelihood the
activations of a victim’s policy network are “normal”.
The victim is Zoo1 or ZooV1. We collect activations
over 20, 000 time steps against each opponent. We fit
a 20-component GMM to activations induced by Zoo1
or ZooO1. Error bars are a 95% confidence interval.
Adv ZooO2 Rand
(b) t-SNE activations of Kick and Defend victim
ZooV2 playing against different opponents. Model
fitted with a perplexity of 250 to activations from
5000 timesteps against each opponent. See Figures 8
and 9 in the supplementary results for visualizations
of other environments and victims.
Figure 5: Analysis of activations of the victim’s policy network. Both the density model and the t-SNE
visualization show that the adversary Adv induces off-distribution activations. Key: legends specify
opponent the victim was pitted against. Adv is the best adversary trained against the victim, and Rand
is a policy taking random actions. Zoo*N corresponds to ZooN (Sumo) or ZooON (otherwise). Zoo*1T
and Zoo*1V are the train and validation datasets, drawn from Zoo1 (Sumo) or ZooO1 (otherwise).
transitive: professional human soccer players and sumo wrestlers can reliably beat amateurs. Despite
this, there is a non-transitive relationship between adversarial policies, victims and masked victims.
Consequently, we urge caution when using methods such as self-play that assume transitivity, and
would recommend more general methods where practical (Balduzzi et al., 2019; Brown et al., 2019).
Our findings also suggest a trade-off in the size of the observation space. In benign environments,
allowing more observation of the environment increases performance. However, this also makes the
agent more vulnerable to adversaries. This is in contrast to an idealized Bayesian agent, where the
value of information is always non-negative (Good, 1967). In the following section, we investigate
further the connection between vulnerability to attack and the size of the observation space.
5.2 Dimensionality
It is well-established that classifiers are more vulnerable to adversarial examples on high-dimensional
inputs (Gilmer et al., 2018b; Khoury and Hadfield-Menell, 2018; Shafahi et al., 2019). We hypothesize
that a similar result is true for adversarial policies: the greater the dimensionality of the component P
of the observation space under control of the adversary, the more vulnerable the victim is to attack. In
the environments by Bansal et al. (2018a), the component P is the position of the adversary’s joints.
We test our hypothesis in the Sumo environment, keeping the task the same but varying whether the
agents are Ants (quadrupedal robots) or Humanoids. The results in Figures 4c and 4d support the
hypothesis: the win rate in the lower dimensional Sumo Ants (dimP = 15) environment is much
lower than in the higher dimensional Sumo Humans (dimP = 24) environment. Specifically, in
Sumo Humans we obtain a win rate of 87% against victim 1, 63% against victim 2 and 44% against
victim 3. By contrast, in Sumo Ants we obtain a win rate of at most 12%.
5.3 Victim Activations
In Section 5.1 we showed that adversarial policies win by creating natural observations that are
adversarial to the victim. In this section, we seek to better understand why these observations are
adversarial. We record activations from each victim’s policy network playing a range of opponents,
and analyse these using a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) and a t-SNE representation. See Section B
in the supplementary material for details of training and hyperparameters.
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We fit a GMM on activations Zoo*1T collected playing against a normal opponent, Zoo1 or ZooV1,
holding out Zoo*1V as a validation set. Figure 5a shows that the adversarial policy Adv induces
activations with the lowest log-likelihood of any opponent. The random baseline Rand is slightly
more probable. The normal opponents Zoo*2 and Zoo*3 induce activations with almost as high
likelihood as the validation set Zoo*1V, except in Sumo Humans where they are as unlikely as Rand.
We plot a t-SNE visualization of the activations of Kick and Defend victim ZooV2 in Figure 5b. As
expected from the density model results, there is a clear separation between between Adv, Rand and
the normal opponent ZooO2. Intriguingly, Adv induces activations more widely dispersed than the
random policy Rand, which in turn are more widely dispersed than ZooO2. We report on the full set
of victim policies in Figures 8 and 9 in the supplementary material.
6 Discussion
We have proposed a novel threat model for reinforcement learning where the attacker controls an
agent acting in the same environment as the victim. The attacker cannot directly modify the victim’s
observations, but can choose an adversarial policy that takes actions creating natural observations
that are adversarial. We have shown that adversarial policies exist in a range of zero-sum simulated
robotics games against state-of-the-art victims trained via self-play to be robust to adversaries.
Moreover, we find that the adversarial policies win not by becoming generally strong players, but
rather by taking actions that confuse the victim. We verify this through qualitative observations of the
adversary’s behavior, and from showing that the performance of the victim improves when it is blind
to the position of the adversary. Furthermore, our evaluation suggests victims in high-dimensional
environments are more vulnerable to adversarial policies, and show adversarial policies induce highly
off-distribution activations in the victim.
While it may at first appear unsurprising that a policy trained as an adversary against another RL
policy would be able to exploit it, we believe that this observation is highly significant. First, the
policies we have attacked were explicitly trained via self-play to minimize exploitability. The same
type of technique has been used in a number of works focused on playing adversarial games directly
against humans, where minimizing exploitability is paramount (Silver et al., 2017; OpenAI, 2018).
Second, the use of fixed victim policies reflects what is likely to be a common use case. In safety
critical systems, where attacks like these would be most concerning, it is standard practice to validate
a model and then freeze it, so as to ensure that the deployed model does not develop any new issues
due to retraining. Therefore, our attack profile is a realistic reflection of what we might see with
RL-trained policies in real-world settings, such as with autonomous vehicles.
Furthermore, even if the target victim uses continual learning, it may be possible to train against a
fixed proxy victim. The attacker could use imitation learning on the target victim to produce a proxy.
Alternatively, in consumer applications such as self-driving vehicles, the attacker can buy a copy of
the system and periodically factory reset it. Once an adversarial policy has been trained against the
proxy, the attacker may be able to transfer this policy to the target, exploiting it until it adapts.
Our results suggest a number of directions for future work. The ease with which policies can be
attacked highlights the need for effective defenses. It may be possible to detect adversarial attacks
using the density model on activations, in which case one could fallback to a conservative policy.
We are also excited at the potential of adversarial training with adversarial policies to improve
robustness. Concretely, we envisage population-based training where new randomly initialized
agents are introduced over time, and allowed to train against a fixed victim for some period of time.
This would expose victims to a much broader range of opponents than conventional self-play or
population-based training. However, it will considerably increase computational requirements, unless
more efficient methods for finding adversarial policies than model-free RL are discovered.
Overall, we are excited about the implications the adversarial policy model has for the robustness,
security and understanding of deep RL policies. Our results show the existence of a previously
unrecognized problem in deep RL, but there remain many open questions. We hope this work
encourages other researchers to investigate this area further. Videos and other supplementary material
are available online at https://adversarialpolicies.github.io/ and our source code is
available at https://github.com/HumanCompatibleAI/adversarial-policies.
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A Training: hyperparameters and computational infrastructure
Parameter Value Search Range Search Distribution
Total Time steps 20× 106 [0, 40× 106] Manual
Batch size 16 384 [2048, 65 536] Log uniform
Number of environments 8 [1, 16] Manual
Mini-batches 4 [1, 128] Log uniform
Epochs per update 4 [1, 11] Uniform
Learning rate 3× 10−4 [1× 10−5, 1× 10−2] Log uniform
Discount 0.99 — —
Maximum Gradient Norm 0.5 — —
Clip Range 0.2 — —
Advantage Estimation Discount 0.95 — —
Entropy coefficient 0.0 — —
Value Function Loss Coefficient 0.5 — —
Table 1: Hyperparameters for Proximal Policy Optimization.
Table 1 gives the hyperparameters used for training. The number of environments was chosen for per-
formance reasons after observing diminishing returns from using more than 8 parallel environments.
The batch size, mini-batches, epochs per update, entropy coefficient and learning rate were tuned via
a random search with 100 samples on two environments, Kick and Defend and Sumo Humans. The
total time steps was chosen by inspection after observing diminishing returns to additional training.
All other hyperparameters are the defaults in the PPO2 implementation in Stable Baselines (Hill et al.,
2019).
We used a mixture of in-house and cloud infrastructure to perform these experiments. It takes around
8 hours to train an adversary for a single victim using 4 cores of an Intel Xeon Platinum 8000
(Skylake) processor.
B Activation Analysis: t-SNE and GMM
We collect activations from all feed forward layers of the victim’s policy network. This gives two
64-length vectors, which we concatenate into a single 128-dimension vector for analysis with a
Gaussian Mixture Model and a t-SNE representation.
B.1 t-SNE hyperparameter selection
We fit models with perplexity 5, 10, 20, 50, 75, 100, 250 and 1000. We chose 250 since qualitatively
it produced the clearest visualization of data with a moderate number of distinct clusters.
B.2 Gaussian Mixture Model hyperparameter selection
We fit models with 5, 10, 20, 40 and 80 components with a full (unrestricted) and diagonal covariance
matrix. We used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and average log-likelihood on a held-
out validation set as criteria for selecting hyperparameters. We found 20 components with a full
covariance matrix achieved the lowest BIC and highest validation log-likelihood in the majority of
environment-victim pairs, and was the runner-up in the remainder.
C Figures
Supplementary figures are provided on the subsequent pages.
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Figure 6: Win rates while training adversary Adv. The adversary exceeds baseline win rates against
most victims in Kick and Defend and You Shall Not Pass, is competitive on Sumo Humans, but
performs poorly in the low-dimensional Sumo Ants environment. Key: The solid line shows the
median win rate for Adv across 5 random seeds, with the shaded region representing the minimum and
maximum. The win rate is smoothed with a rolling average over 100, 000 timesteps. Baselines are
shown as horizontal dashed lines. Agents Rand and Zero take random and zero actions respectively.
The Zoo baseline is whichever ZooM (Sumo) or ZooOM (other environments) agent achieves the highest
win rate. The victim is ZooN (Sumo) or ZooVN (other environments), where N is given in the title
above each figure.
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Figure 7: Percentage of episodes (out of 1000) won by the opponent, won by the victim or tied.
Victims are on the y-axis and opponents on the x-axis. The cell with the highest opponent win
rate in each row has a red border. The adversary exceeds baseline win rates for most environments
and victims. Key: Agents Zoo* are pre-trained policies by Bansal et al. (2018a). In Sumo, a
symmetric environment, they are labeled ZooN where N is a random seed. In the other (asymmetric)
environments, they are labeled ZooVN and ZooON for the Victim and Opponent agents. Victims with
observations masked are labeled ZooMVN or ZooMN. Opponents AdvN are the best adversarial policy
of 5 seeds trained against the corresponding ZooVN or ZooN. Agents Rand and Zero are baseline
agents taking random and zero actions respectively.
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Adversary (Adv) Normal (Zoo) Random (Rand)
(a) Kick and Defend, victim 1 (b) Kick and Defend, victim 2 (c) Kick and Defend, victim 3
(d) Sumo Humans, victim 1 (e) Sumo Humans, victim 2 (f) Sumo Humans, victim 3
(g) Sumo Ants, victim 1 (h) Sumo Ants, victim 2 (i) Sumo Ants, victim 3
(j) Sumo Ants, victim 4 (k) You Shall Not Pass, victim 1
Figure 8: t-SNE activations of the victim when playing against different opponents. There is a clear
separation between the activations induced by Adv and those of the normal opponent Zoo. Model
fitted with a perplexity of 250 to activations from 5000 timesteps against each opponent. The victim
is ZooN (Sumo) or ZooVN (other environments), where N is given in the caption below each figure.
Opponent Adv is the best adversary trained against the victim. Opponent Zoo corresponds to ZooN
(Sumo) or ZooON (other environments). See Figure 9 for activations for a single opponent at a time.
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Adversary (Adv) Normal (Zoo) Random (Rand)
(a) Kick and Defend.
(b) You Shall Not Pass.
(c) Sumo Humans.
(d) Sumo Ants.
Figure 9: t-SNE activations of victim Zoo1 (Sumo) or ZooV1 (other environments). The results are
the same as in Figure 8 but decomposed into individual opponents for clarity. Model fitted with a
perplexity of 250 to activations from 5000 timesteps against each opponent. Opponent Adv is the best
adversary trained against the victim. Opponent Zoo is Zoo1 (Sumo) or ZooO1 (other environments).
See Figure 8 for results for other victims (one plot per victim).
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